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While some accounts of rights and property paradigms see property as an inherent incident of
a colonizing form of human rights law and discourse, others draw out the contradictions
between them, suggesting that human rights and property have opposing impulses towards
inclusion and exclusion respectively. While not rejecting the insights of either of these posi-
tions, the author argues that a fundamental ambivalence lies at the heart of human rights
law and discourse demonstrating both oppressive and emancipatory potential. This ambiva-
lence is, the author argues, also internal to theWestern property concept – a claim facilitating
a renewed emphasis upon property’s inclusory potential as an institutional foundation for a
more eco-humane and vulnerability-responsive ordering of legal relations.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the frequently fractious and under-theorized relationship between human rights and
the environment, the question of property is often implicated. Human rights, it will be
suggested below, have a high degree of elusiveness and contestability and are the tar-
get of a range of critiques which are (perhaps especially in the environmental context)
ultimately united by an attempt to expose, resist and/or replace the ontological suppo-
sitions lying at the foundations of Western narratives of ‘progress’, private property
and the unsustainable capitalist exploitation of natural resources.1 At the same
* This article draws on earlier work, most notably: ‘Framing the Project: The Dysfunctional
Family of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ in C Gearty and C Douzinas, The Cam-
bridge Handbook of Human Rights (CUP, Cambridge 2012); Chapter 8 of Redirecting Human
Rights: Facing the Challenge of Corporate Legal Humanity (Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke
2010); ‘A Tale of the Land, the Insider, the Outsider and Human Rights’ (2003) 23/1 Legal
Studies 33. The author would like to thank the following people for comment and critique
on the relevant parts of the earlier work forming the heart of this argument: Kevin Gray;
Upendra Baxi; Conor Gearty; Costas Douzinas; Brigid Hadfield; Peter Edge; Michael Daly;
Susan Gibbons; and for their comments on this paper, Karen Morrow, Evadne Grant and
Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos.
1. See, for example, U Baxi, Future of Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 2006); K Bosselmann,
When Two Worlds Collide: Society and Ecology (RSVP, Auckland 1995); M Horkheimer and
T Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (Stanford University Press, Stanford 2002); V Shiva,
Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development (Zed Books, London 1989); V Shiva, Stolen
Harvest: The Hijacking of the World Food Supply (South End Press, Cambridge MA 2002);
U Matei and L Nader, Plunder (Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford 2008).
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time, however, another perspective suggests that human rights are inherently at odds
with the more exclusive implications of the Western property construct and operate as
a kind of limit on property claims.2 While both of these views provide powerful
insights into the complex relationship between human rights and property, it is poten-
tially more transformative to appreciate the relationship between them in terms of a
shared ambivalence reflecting their mutual and fundamental openness to conflicting
impulses of oppression and emancipation, exclusion and inclusion. This article will
suggest that property, despite its mainstream formulation as being predominantly
exclusive,3 can be theorized in such a way as to render it open to alternative readings
that are more compatible with ontological suppositions supporting a re-imagined rela-
tionship between human rights and the environment4 in the search for ‘worlds other’
and for an eco-humane future worthy of the name. The account here will begin by
introducing the elusiveness and contestability of human rights, before organizing
their complex contradictions using the framework of Baxi’s ‘two notions’ of human
rights.5 After linking the two notions (‘modern’ and ‘contemporary’) directly with
the history of human rights in relation to the right to property and to historically related
patterns of social exclusion (and countervailing claims for inclusion) the ambivalence of
property itself will be explored. It will be argued that exclusion is analytically separable
from the function of ‘excludability’6 as the conceptual foundation of any coherent prop-
erty claim, and that there is scope, even within the much-maligned Western property
paradigm, for an inclusive re-imagination of property. This can be linked to an inclu-
sory, emancipatory form of human rights in order to reveal the mutual potential of
human rights and property in the service of fashioning a distributive, environmental jus-
tice responsive to a re-imagined ontology of both the human and the environmental.
This development is fundamentally necessary for the transformation of the relationship
between human rights and the environment and for an eco-humane future worth living.
2 THE ELUSIVENESS AND CONTESTABILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights are arguably still the dominant ethical language of claim7 – a fact which
may help explain, in part at least, why environmental imperatives are now so often
2. See especially, K Gray and S Gray, ‘Private Property and Public Propriety’ in J McLean
(ed) Property and the Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1999) 11–39; K Gray and S Gray,
‘Civil Rights, Civil Wrongs and Quasi-Public Space’ (1999) European Human Rights Law
Review 46.
3. ‘In some deep sense the sustained exercise of exclusory power is perhaps all there really is
to the grand claim of proprietary ownership’: K Gray, ‘Property in Common Law Systems’ in
GE van Maanan and AJ Van der Walt (eds), Property on the Threshold of the 21st Century
(MAKLU, Antwerp 1996) at 265.
4. See A Grear, ‘The Vulnerable Living Order: Human Rights and the Environment in a Cri-
tical and Philosophical Perspective’ (2011) 2/1 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 23.
5. Baxi (n 1) at 33–58.
6. See K Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ (1991) 50 Cambridge LJ 252 and discussion below at
n 59 and related text.
7. M Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton University Press, Princeton
2001) at 53, n 1 and n 2 and the references cited there: E Wiesel, ‘A Tribute to Human Rights’
in Y Danieli and others (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Fifty Years and
Beyond (Baywood, Amityville NY 1999) at 3 (describing human rights as a ‘world-wide secu-
lar religion’), and N Gordimer, ‘Reflections by Nobel Laureates’, in Y Danieli and others (eds),
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brought within the legal and rhetorical ambit of human rights law and discourse. For
all their undoubted power, however, human rights remain the subject of a range of
excoriating critiques, some of which are now well-embedded within mainstream
human rights scholarship and debate. It is well known, for example, that cultural rela-
tivist arguments deconstruct the ‘universalism’ of human rights and bring a range of
critiques to bear, including those emerging from ‘Asian values’, Islam and postmo-
dernism.8 Implicit and explicit within such accounts is a closely related accusation
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an instrument of ‘Western cultural
imperialism’, a mere Trojan horse for the imposition of ‘Western’ commitments upon
‘non-Western’ cultures – that the notion of human rights is Eurocentric in both origin
and formulation.9 This accusation, moreover, addresses itself directly and indirectly to
the ontological and epistemological assumptions informing mainstream human rights
law and discourse – a fact linking a range of ‘outsider’ critiques directly to ecological
critiques of our current philosophical and juridical paradigms.10 Ranging through
feminism, post-colonial critique, intersectional analyses sensitive to speciesism,
accounts sensitive to ecological epistemology, the politics of everyday location, to
so-called third world (TWAIL) scholarship,11 a chorus of critics point to the closures
ibid, at vii describing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as ‘the essential document,
the touchstone, the creed of humanity that surely sums up all other creeds directing human
behaviour’. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan viewed the Declaration as ‘the yardstick
by which we measure human progress’ (Ignatieff, ibid).
8. See, for examples of discussions canvassing relevant and related arguments, K Engle,
‘Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context’ (2000) 32/2 Journal of Interna-
tional Law and Politics 291; H Samuels, ‘Hong Kong on Women, Asian Values and the Law’
(1999) 21/3 Human Rights Quarterly 707; AJ Langlois, The Politics of Justice and Human Rights:
South East Asia and Universalist Theory (CUP, Cambridge 2001); K Dalacoura, Islam, Liberal-
ism and Human Rights (3rd edn) (IB Tauris and Co Ltd, London 2007); M Ignatieff, ‘The Attack
on Human Rights’ (2001) 80 Foreign Affairs 102; Z Arslan, ‘Taking Rights Less Seriously: Post-
modernism and Human Rights’ (1999) 5 Res Publica 195; T Campbell, KD Ewing and Adam
Tomkins, Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 2001).
9. For example, see M Matua, ‘Savages, Victims and Saviours: The Metaphor of Human
Rights’ (2001) 42/1 Harvard International Law Journal 201.
10. See L Code, Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location (OUP, Oxford 2006),
who proposes an epistemic revolution comparable to the Kantian shift which installed ‘man’ as
the centre of the universe. She points out that the recognition of the parochialism of Kant’s con-
ception of ‘man’, and which lay at the heart of what she names as ‘Kant’s Copernican revolution’
in the sphere of the philosophical–conceptual, is recognized by a range of theoretical stances:
feminist, socialist, post-colonialist and by critical race theory (at 3). Code’s thesis links the epis-
temological closures of the West fairly unambiguously to environmental devastation. See also,
K Bosselmann, ‘Losing the Forest for the Trees: Environmental Reductionism in the Law’
(2010) 2 Sustainability 2424.
11. See, for example, the discussions in M-BDembour,Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflec-
tions on the European Convention (CUP, Cambridge 2006); C Douzinas, Human Rights and
Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge-Cavendish (Glasshouse),
Abingdon 2007); C Gearty, Can Human Rights Survive? (CUP, Cambridge 2006); MA Glendon,
Rights-Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (Free Press, New York 1996). For dis-
cussions of the exclusions of human rights in particular, see, for example, D Otto, ‘Disconcerting
“Masculinities”: Reinventing the Gendered Subject(s) of International Human Rights Law’ in
D Buss and A Manji (eds), International Human Rights Law: Modern Feminist Approaches
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005) 105–29; D Otto, ‘Lost in Translation: Rescripting the Sexed
Subjects of International Human Rights Law’ in A Orford (ed), International Law and its Others
(CUP, Cambridge 2006); F Beveridge and S Mullally, ‘International Human Rights and Body
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of human rights as they find expression within the liberal legal paradigm and the neo-
liberal world order.
The structural tendencies and ideological tilt of the international human rights law
regime does, it must be said, offer evidence in support of such critiques. The criti-
cism, for example, that civil and political rights are favoured over economic and
social rights within the institutional mechanisms of international human rights
law12 is frequently understood to reflect a fundamental privileging of liberal
constructs of rights descended from the ideological commitments of the ‘West’.
It has even been convincingly argued that the entire international human rights
law project stands discursively colonized by the project of neoliberal capitalism
and by the hegemonic power of transnational corporations within the international
legal order.13 Such arguments can obviously be linked to numerous critiques draw-
ing upon an earlier Marxist characterization of natural rights as being individualistic
tools of the capitalist project.14 Such critiques (both historical and contemporary)
strongly imply that hierarchies and asymmetries observable in international
human rights law reflect agendas far removed from the affirmation of the equal
worth and dignity of all members of the ‘human family’. This is a criticism borne
out, moreover, even in the context of the so-called ‘third generation’ (or ‘solidarity’)
rights, including the human right to a clean environment: a range of problems
reflecting the fundamental fracture between the broadly (neo)liberal ideological
commitments linked to the primacy of civil and political rights and a lamentable
failure to realize the economic and social rights of the economically disempowered
peoples and nations of the earth replicate themselves in the context of environmental
injustice, including climate change injustice.15 Indeed, the environmental crisis itself
can be interpreted as a crisis of human hierarchy.16 It is fair to say that human rights
law, in both theory and practice, is riven with contradictions, disputations, rival
framings and oppositional accounts, and that such critical instabilities render rights
paradigms at best complex.
Matters become even more challenging when we consider that the epistemic com-
plexity of human rights law and discourse is exacerbated by the contingency of all its
available framings. Framings are always an exercise of epistemic closure or limitation
Politics’ in J Bridgeman and S Millns (eds), Law and Body Politics: Regulating the Female Body
(Dartmouth, Aldershot 1995); R Kapur, ‘Human Rights in the 21st Century: Take a Walk on the
Dark Side’ (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 664; M Dekha, ‘Intersectionality and Post-human
Visions of Equality’ (2008) 23 Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender and Society 249; A Anghie,
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP, Cambridge 2005).
12. See, for an introduction to the depth of the challenge, D Beetham, ‘What Future for Eco-
nomic and Social Rights?’ (1995) 43/1 Political Studies 41. See also, the excoriating critique of
the imperatives of neoliberal globalization and their deleterious effect upon the realization of
socio-economic rights offered by Baxi (n 1).
13. See Baxi (n 1); S Gill, ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neoliberalism’
(1995) 24 Millennium Journal of International Studies 399.
14. See K Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’ in Selected Essays by Karl Marx (HJ Stenning,
trans.) (Leonard Parsons, London and New York 1926).
15. For more, see the contributions in (2010) 1/2 The Journal of Human Rights and the Envir-
onment 131–256.
16. This is an insight intrinsic to, for example, eco-feminism, but is also underlined by reali-
ties such as environmental racism. See L Westra, Faces of Environmental Racism: Confronting
Issues of Global Justice (Rowman and Littlefied, London 2001).
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in the sense that we inevitably tend to draw attention to selected aspects of a perceived
‘something’ at the expense of a host of other candidates for attention17 – and such
contingency, particularly in a highly contested field such as human rights, presents
the fractious challenge of negotiating a path through a highly varied set of epistemic
limitations and closures. However, neither the semantic and political contestability of
human rights, nor the deep realities of contingency and epistemic limitation are neces-
sarily a cause for despair. Indeed, the energy implicit in the wide range of critical
accounts of human rights implies that the unsettledness of human rights can be under-
stood as productive – even emancipatory. Thus human rights can be understood to
function as ‘ideas’ (albeit powerful, world-shaping ideas) which operate as semanti-
cally elusive ‘placeholder[s] in a global conversation that allows a constant deferral of
the central defining moment in which rights themselves will be infused with sub-
stance’.18 This insight emphasizes the productive sense in which the meaning of
human rights is always ‘up for grabs’.
Despite the ideological closures that can be seen to accompany them, human rights
always remain, to borrow the language of Douzinas, ‘floating signifiers’:19 their pro-
mise of ‘worlds other’, the sense in which they construct an emancipatory imaginary,
draws out a deeply human longing for an ever-deferred ‘not yet’ of a justice hoped
for, as yet, unseen, but glimpsed as an eskhatos (a final, furthest, remote horizon).
The meanings of human rights remain contestable, semantically and semiotically
unsettled, radically porous, open to co-option, colonization and, importantly, never,
ever above the interplay of power relations. This openness, like the face of Janus,
is bi-directional. It is the source of the susceptibility of human rights to, for example,
colonization by corporations,20 but also of the emancipatory energies that overflow
the present limits of rights in the name of rights and the justice they reach for.
Human rights, in short, have a fundamental ambivalence, a dual capacity for produ-
cing and cloaking privilege and simultaneously for unveiling oppression and articu-
lating emancipatory hope and resistance. Human rights, when deployed as a basis
of an inclusory claim by the ‘others’ of rights,21 function as the ‘rights of those
who have not the rights that they have and have the rights that they have not’ – in
the famous words of Ranciere.22 It would be a mistake, therefore, to assume a univo-
cal meaning of the term ‘human rights’, or to suppose that the term necessarily pro-
vides a stable referent, when thinking about the relationship between rights and
property paradigms at the nexus between human rights and the environment.
As indicated briefly above, a central critical claim made concerning human rights
and property paradigms is the claim that human rights emerge from a liberal
17. ‘Frames are principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit the-
ories about what exists, what happens, and what matters’: T Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watch-
ing: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left (University of California Press,
Berkeley and London 1980) at 6.
18. A Ely-Yamin, ‘Empowering Visions: Towards a Dialectical Pedagogy of Human Rights’
(1993) 15/4 Human Rights Quarterly 640 at 663.
19. C Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2000) 253–61.
20. See Baxi (n 1); A Grear, Redirecting Human Rights: Facing the Challenge of Corporate
Legal Humanity (Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke 2010).
21. See n 11.
22. J Ranciere, ‘Who is the Subject of Human Rights?’ (2004) 103 South Atlantic Quarterly
297 at 302.
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framework in which rights and property are densely imbricated. Indeed, so intimate is
the ideological relationship between liberal legal rights subjectivity and property
ideology that the rights-bearing person and the construct of private property have
been conceptualized as being mutually interdependent in analytical terms.23 There
is a strong case for suggesting that the ontology of human rights, private property
and autonomous liberal persons share fundamental presuppositions implicating the
central Western subject-object distinction/mind-body split/rational-mastery/irrational-
‘nature’ relation closely linked to environmental degradation.24
Yet, despite the fact that human rights share fundamental ontological suppositions
with liberal property paradigms and liberal legal systems there remains, as already
noted, a human rights energy which reaches ‘beyond’ – beyond the ‘now’ of law
towards the ‘not yet’ of justice as law’s endlessly elusive horizon. Accordingly,
despite the fact that the challenges presented by legal closure seem to become
more intense as human rights themselves become more technical and positivistic
(as they are internalized by legal systems as ‘positive’ law) there remains a vivid
sense in which the language and aspiration of human rights as an ‘idea’ functions
resistively as a supra-legal category of critique directed at positive human rights
law itself.25 Douzinas argues that the ‘extensive positivisation of human rights…
[means that] the external division between legal and human rights has been replicated
in the body of human rights themselves’,26 exposing a key facet of their fundamental
ambivalence. Importantly, this supra-legal critique can be understood to be energized
not by human beings conceived of as mere abstractions or bloodless universals, but as
beings conveying a ‘felt’ injustice.27 In other words, subtending the legal closures of
human rights and even the philosophical abstraction of arguments concerning ‘moral
rights’, is a visceral energy emerging from the ‘felt’ socio-physical predicaments of
human beings who deploy the idea and language of rights as vivid claims to precisely
that to which they are not yet legally entitled28 in order to rupture the surface of the
legal order with calls for a justice reaching beyond it and responsive to their most
creaturely predicaments. There exists an energizing space between human rights as
law and human rights as carriers of possible ‘worlds beyond’, or ‘worlds other’.
In this, we can explicitly conceptualize the voices disrupting the settled patterns of
23. See the discussion in Grear (n 20), Chapters 3 and 4, and the references therein, espe-
cially: M Davis and N Naffine, Are Persons Property? Legal Debates about Property and Per-
sonality (Ashgate, Aldershot 2001); P Halewood, ‘Law’s Bodies: Disembodiment and the
Structure of Liberal Property Rights’ (1996) 81 Iowa Law Review 1331; J Nedelsky, ‘Law,
Boundaries and the Bounded Self’ (1990) 30 Representations 162.
24. Bosselmann (n 1); Code (n 10); Anghie (n 11).
25. This is a central argument in Douzinas (n 19) above.
26. Douzinas (n 19) at 244.
27. Baxi analogously captures this tension in a distinction between the politics ‘of’ human
rights (closely linked to statecraft and law) and the politics ‘for’ human rights: ‘This new
form of sensibility, arising from the responsiveness to the tortured and tormented voices of
the violated, speaks to us of an alternate politics seeking, against the heavy odds of the histories
of power, that order of progress which makes the state incrementally more ethical, governance
progressively just, and power increasingly accountable’, Baxi (n 1) at 58.
28. This dynamic was key, for example, in the dismantling of apartheid; it lay at the roots of
the civil rights movement in the US; in the energies of women’s rights movements all over the
world, and more recently, animates campaigns for gay equality and marriage rights, animal
rights and so forth.
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human rights as positive law as belonging to inter-relationally co-formed beings
whose embodied vulnerability and fundamental ‘animality’ (in a non-perjorative,
creaturely sense) places them in common cause with non-human animals and the ecol-
ogies of which humans are but a particularly self-conscious element. Breaching, there-
fore, the comparatively closed surface of human rights as law, there emerge claims
and possibilities reflecting lived ontologies unaccounted for by the hegemony of
mono-cultural Western epistemic mastery.29 The space opened up between human
rights as law and human rights as critique in this formulation offers the chance for
a re-directed human rights ethics, but it also, importantly, invites fresh energies to
confront the concept of property.
Property, it will be argued, (suitably re-imagined) can be united with precisely the
kind of critical human rights energy reaching for new forms of ecological and distri-
butive justice. Indeed, it may even be the case that the relationship between rights and
property paradigms cannot adequately be theorized without examining it squarely in
the light of the semiotic and political ambivalence of human rights. How then, are we
to move towards a re-imagination of the relationship between rights and property
paradigms in the light of the complexity, tensions and sheer contestability surround-
ing human rights? Fortunately, Baxi has offered a formulation channelling the com-
plexity of human rights law and critique into two distinct notions of human rights
which can usefully be deployed here in order to offer a property-sensitive account
of human rights ambivalence.
3 TWO NOTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Baxi characterizes two distinct and competing notions of human rights: ‘modern’ and
‘contemporary’.30 He argues that the two notions differ in four major respects:
(1) their respective encapsulation of the logics of exclusion and inclusion; (2) the
distinctive languages of human rights utilized; (3) in relation to ‘ascetic versus carniva-
listic rights production’; and (4) in their contrasting relationships between human rights
and human suffering.31 Baxi’s account is particularly useful for present purposes
because there is a high degree of what we can call property-sensitivity in his framework,
in the form of a structural intimacy between the ‘modern’ conception of human
rights, the modern subject and property. Baxi argues, in line with post-colonial
critiques, that the ‘modern’ notion of human rights has historically been deployed to
produce ‘justified’ forms of human suffering. Clearly implicating the ontological foun-
dations of the Western conception of the subject, Baxi argues that:
[t]he criteria of individuation in the European liberal tradition of thought furnished some of
the most powerful ideas in constructing a model of human rights. Only those beings were to
be regarded as ‘human’ who were possessed of the capacity for reason and autonomous
moral will. What counted as reason and will varied in the course of the long development
of the European liberal traditions; however, the modern paradigm of human rights, in its
major phases of development excluded ‘slaves’, ‘heathens’, ‘barbarians’, colonized peoples,
indigenous populations, women, children, the impoverished, and the ‘insane’, at various
29. V Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (Routledge, London 1993).
30. Baxi (n 1).
31. Ibid, 44–50.
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times and in various ways, from those considered worthy of being bearers of human rights.
The discursive devices of Enlightenment rationality constituted the grammars of violent
social exclusion.32
Accordingly, for Baxi, the principal historical role performed by the ‘modern’ construc-
tion of human rights was the imposition of ‘justified’ suffering in the cause of colonialism
and imperialism: ‘The “modern” human rights cultures, tracing their pedigree to the Idea
of Progress, Social Darwinism, racism and patriarchy (central to the “Enlightenment”
ideology) justified global imposition of cruelty as “natural”, “ethical” and “just”’.33
Indeed, Baxi even suggests that ‘[m]aking human suffering invisible was the hallmark
of “modern” (liberal) human rights formations’.34
This account resonates with many a critical account of the ‘human’ embedded in the
‘modern’ notion of human rights, linking the ‘subject of rights’ as aWestern ideological
construct with the historical imposition of ‘justified’ (invisible) suffering not only upon
marginalized humans as the ‘others’ of rights, but upon non-human animals.35 The
subject at the heart of the notion of modern human rights emerges as the patriarchal,
raced and appropriative rational property owner. Indeed, this property-owning para-
digmatic bearer of rights possesses a dominance extensively identified by authorita-
tive, detailed historical accounts of the genesis of rights, and which inexorably link
rights settlements at the moment of their transmutation from revolutionizing social
energies into their institutionalized forms36 with the preservation of the power of
propertied male elites.37 It is, in short, the white, male property owner which emerges
as the quintessential ‘modern’ human rights beneficiary.
The precise contours of the ‘human’ of the ‘modern’ human rights notion are further
revealed and contested by the characteristically ‘carnivalistic’ (exuberant) production
typical of the ‘contemporary’ notion of human rights. ‘Contemporary’ human rights
dynamics have produced a heterogeneous array of documents specifying the rights of
marginalized humans, the ‘others’ of the modern paradigm – the human rights, for
example, of ‘the girl child, migrant labour, indigenous peoples, gays and lesbians
(…), prisoners and those in custodial institutional regimes, refugees, and asylum-
seekers’ children’.38 This dynamic, significantly, emphasizes the explicit contours
of the historically real exclusions forged by the universal subject of human rights, pre-
senting a set of repeated critiques emerging from a world of embodied, situated, ‘felt’
exclusion/s and injustice and reflecting the supra-legal transcendent energy of human
rights critique.
From this we can see the clear contrast between the contemporary and modern
notions of human rights. The construction of ‘modern’ human rights reveals, in
32. Baxi (n 1) at 44, emphasis original.
33. U Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 2002) at 32.
34. Baxi (n 33) at 33.
35. See Dekha (n 11); D Nibert, Animal Rights/Human Rights: Entanglements of Oppression
and Liberation (Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham MD 2002).
36. N Stammers, Human Rights and Social Movements (Pluto Press, London 2009);
N Stammers, ‘Social Movements and the Social Construction of Human Rights’ (1999) 21
Human Rights Quarterly 980.
37. M Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era
(University of California Press, Berkeley 2004); L Hunt, The French Revolution and Human
Rights: A Brief Documentary History (Bedford/St Martin’s Press, New York 1996).
38. Baxi (n 33) at 32, footnote 17. See also, B Weston ‘Human Rights’, Encylopedia Britan-
nica 20: 56.
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essence, a radical and mutually constituting interdependence between personhood and
property and the elevation of the private property right. Indeed, it seems that property
was always pivotal to the freedoms of the liberal human rights bearer. As Woodiwiss
points out:
…at the point in time when [French Declaration and the American Bill of Rights (1791)]
were written and even today, especially in the United States, economic inequality was
and is unchallenged… because as both compendia make explicit, property ownership repre-
sents the principal mode of securing one’s life and pursuing happiness.39
Baxi is explicit concerning the fact that the ‘absolutist right to property’ forms one of
two constitutive elements of the ‘modern’ human rights paradigm (along with ‘the
collective human right of the coloniser to subjugate “inferior” peoples’).40 Thus:
[l]ong before slavery was abolished, and women got recognition for the right to contest and
vote at elections, corporations had appropriated rights to personhood, claiming due process
rights for regimes of property denied to human beings. The unfoldment of …‘modern’
human rights is the story of near-absoluteness of the right to property as a basic human
right. So too is the narrative of colonisation/imperialism which began its career with the
archetypal East India Company (which ruled India for a century) when corporate sover-
eignty was inaugurated.41
4 HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROPERTY PARADIGMS
It is not just post-colonial and other critical accounts that underline the intimacy
between rights and property. Indeed, well established historical analyses emphasize
the fact that the very idea of ‘subjective right’ first emerged from the central idea
of dominium over property.42 Accordingly, relatively mainstream historical accounts
unite with broadly critical accounts to suggest that human rights have, at various
points, been inherently concerned with the privileging of property interests. Clearly,
depending upon how property is formulated, this linkage or intimacy will have either
oppressive or emancipatory possibilities – but in so far as the intimacy between
human rights and property is the embodiment of ‘an exclusionary conception of
autonomy’,43 it will tend towards the exclusory social practices so impugned by cri-
tical accounts.
One particularly influential contrasting perspective on the relationship between
property and human rights is based upon the assertion that human rights and property
39. A Woodiwiss, Human Rights (Routledge, Abingdon 2005) at 39. Interestingly, although
the 1776 American Declaration of Independence makes no reference to property rights, listing
the inalienable rights as ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’, it has been suggested that,
by the time of the Constitution of 1787, there had been, in effect, a counter-revolution by
propertied elites.
40. Baxi (n 33) at 31.
41. Ibid, at 154.
42. See R Tuck,Natural Rights Theories (CUP, Cambridge University Press 1979), Chapter 1 –
cited by Douzinas (n 19) at 244.
43. Woodiwiss (n 39) at 13. Woodiwiss makes reference to the well-known arguments of
Glendon concerning the impoverishment of rights-talk: Glendon (n 11).
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serve contrasting, or inherently contradictory, ends.44 This view (which in its more
recent formulations could owe something, perhaps, to the contemporary notion of
human rights) juxtaposes human rights and property in a partially contradictory
relation, and implies that human rights are inherently democratic (or inclusory)
while property tends to be predominantly exclusory in formulation and function.
This is an important view. It is partially reflected, for example, in the influential
work of Gray and Gray45 and hints at the way in which human rights rhetoric
and aspiration can indeed press property towards tantalizing new horizons of access
and justice.
Matters, however, are more complex even than this. As argued above, human
rights are far from straightforwardly inclusory (even at the international level).
While it is correct to suggest that property is predominantly constructed as exclusory,
and that human rights discourse can be read as inclusory, it is ultimately more enligh-
tening to emphasize the idea that both human rights and property are radically norma-
tively and interpretively open to contradictory constructions of their nature.46 Both
property and human rights, in other words, possess oppressive and emancipatory
potential – both are ambivalent. Property – in short – potentially shares with
human rights a productive contingency yet to be fully exploited in the cause of envir-
onmental and distributive justice.
In order to explore this possibility and to trace its emancipatory implications, it is
important to examine the nature of property in relation to human rights claims a little
more closely. This is important, not only because of the intimacy between property
and human rights, but because, in practice, human rights and environmental consid-
erations are frequently outweighed by assertions of property rights (whether as a
human right or a private law right). How we conceptualize property itself thus has
a crucial role to play in reformulating the balance of relationships between human
rights and property in the human-environmental nexus.
First, it is important to concede that property is rightly at the heart of numerous
critiques concerning social exclusion and injustice. Property rights and appropria-
tive impulses enacted through the defence of property rights have been thoroughly
implicated in a wide range of forms of social and economic exclusion linked to
the privileging of the liberal legal subject and to that subject’s dominant construc-
tion as the bounded, atomistic and autonomous property owner.47 Property has
been linked to the abstract quasi-disembodiment and commodification of the
liberal subject of rights;48 to the related dominance in Anglo-American law of a
construct of the property owner-legal-subject;49 to the widespread predations of
44. This is an understandable assumption, since there are clear tensions between an exclusory
reading of the property right and countervailing human rights interests in, for example, demo-
cratic inclusion: Gray and Gray (n 2).
45. Above (n 2).
46. A Grear, ‘A Tale of the Land, The Insider, The Outsider and Human Rights’ (2003)
23 Legal Studies 33.
47. Nedelsky (n 23).
48. Halewood (n 23).
49. Davis and Naffine (n 23). It should be noted that this is a construct/subject for which the
corporation is an almost perfect match: C Federman, ‘Constructing Kinds of Persons in 1886:
Corporate and Criminal’ (2003) 14 Law and Critique 167; Grear (n 20). Its production has been
decisively linked to the ideological production of the criminal legal subject to protect the
emergent interests of a rising capitalist propertied class in the nineteenth century in
England: A Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law
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the colonial era;50 to extensive forms of contemporary abuse under the conditions
of advanced neo-liberal globalization.51 Property is rightly problematized, therefore,
by those critiques centring upon its exclusory impulses and implications. Yet,
despite the undoubted potency of such critiques, property is a right of considerable
and mounting complexity in the human rights context52 and is becoming ever more
contested.
4.1 Property: a contested concept under increasing pressure
Property is a site of intense and growing contestation, perhaps most particularly at those
sites of legal interaction reflecting the most intimate links between human embodiment,
embodied situatedness and/or bodily movement and basic needs, such as land disputes
and water rights conflicts. Both of these raise issues that are only set to become more
challenging as the unfolding climate change crisis progresses and we move towards
new pressures on land and the likely scenario of mass environmental refugee migra-
tions and water wars.53 It is an obvious point (perhaps too often overlooked in
legal property and human rights discourse) that human beings, as corporeal beings,
(Butterworths, London 2001). In America there was an even more revealing, virtually simulta-
neous production of the corporate legal subject and the criminal subject in the service of the
same elite capitalist interests, also in the relevant nineteenth century time period: Federman
(n 49). This was a period in which capitalist states were at great pains to emphasize the indepen-
dent legal subjectivity of the corporate form: M Neocleous, ‘Staging Power: Marx, Hobbes and the
Personification of Capital’ (2003) 14 Law and Critique 147. The influence of the changing needs
of the dominant economic elite has decisively influenced theories of the corporation in the courts:
GA Marks, ‘The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law’ (1987) 54 The
University of Chicago Law Review 1441; J Flynn, ‘The Jurisprudence of Corporate Personhood:
The Misuse of a Legal Concept’ in W Samuels and A Miller (eds), Corporations and Society:
Power and Responsibility (Greenwood Press, New York 1987); M Horwitz, ‘Santa Clara
Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory’ (1985) 88 West Virginia Law Review 173.
Meanwhile, corporations have taken full advantage of the demise of theorization to exploit the pro-
tections of the American Bill of Rights: CJ Mayer, ‘Personalising the Impersonal: Corporations
and the Bill of Rights’ (1990) 41 Hastings Law Journal 577. All these developments help explain
the corporate colonization of international human rights law (see Baxi (n 1); Grear (n 20)).
50. Baxi (n 1); J MacLean, ‘The Transnational Corporation in History: Lessons for Today?’
(2004) 79 Indiana Law Journal 363.
51. Baxi (n 1); R Shamir, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A Case of Hegemony and Counter-
Hegemony’ in B De Sousa Santos and CA Rodrigues-Garavito (eds), Law and Globalisation
from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (CUP, Cambridge 2005) 92–117; Anghie
(n 11); T Evans and AJ Ayers, ‘In the Service of Power: The Global Political Economy of
Citizenship and Human Rights’ (2006) 10 Citizenship Studies 239–308.
52. For example, consider the fact that while Article 17 of the UDHR endows ‘everyone’ with
the ‘right to hold property, alone or in association with others’ that, while other rights in the
UDHR are further elaborated in the ICCPR and the ICESCR, the right to property finds no
further elaboration in these two covenants (see Baxi, above (n 33) at 145). This perhaps signals
a certain ambivalence concerning property rights in relation to the inherently more distributive
concerns underlying socio-economic rights.
53. LWestra, Environmental Justice and the Rights of Ecological Refugees (Earthscan, London
2009); M Hertsgaard, Hot: Living Through the Next Fifty Years on Earth (Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt, Boston MA 2011); see also the discussion of ‘Scarcity, Conflict and Warfare’ in
D Nibert, ‘The Fire Next Time: The Coming Cost of Capitalism, Animal Oppression and Envir-
onmental Ruin’ (2012) 3/1 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 141 at 155–8.
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cannot ultimately be separated from what we call ‘the environment’.54 Our radical
dependence upon the materialities of the environment becomes particularly non-
negotiable in the context of land and water disputes, and in our contemporary situa-
tion legal regimes, including the institutional machinery of human rights law, are
increasingly required to face up to the implications of complex effects of globalization
and pressures of climate change upon our interdependencies with the living
world. We, as a species, understand almost as never before (yet continue to avoid
the implications of) the radical continuities between our existence, our practices,
the environment, and the violently uneven55 global economic system now controlling
our fates and deepening the crisis of both humanity and earth.
At present (and set against this background) there are a set of identifiable and grow-
ing tensions in the law concerning access to land, which have been characterized as
being tensions between property and human rights – including those tensions introduced
at important sites of civic interaction such as city centres where public values of access
and inclusion are increasingly threatened by the commercial privatization of previously
public spaces.56 Responding to precisely this challenge, Gray and Gray57 conceptualize
property as a predominantly exclusory discourse that stands challenged by human rights
to civil and political inclusion conceived of as a counter-discourse. This is indeed, a
widely reflected characterization, long embraced, for example in common law jurisdic-
tions beyond that of England and Wales, and reflected there in the on-going judicial
negotiation of the relationship between the Human Rights Act 1998 and the traditional
conception of property rights in land. In this context, the question is to what extent the
more ‘open textured secular morality of the EHCR’ will ultimately be enabled to chal-
lenge traditional exclusory applications of property-reasoning.58
What is really at stake in such situations, however, is not a conflict between human
rights and property paradgims in any homogenous sense. The conflict is between an
exclusory construction of property and an inclusory construction of human rights.
We have already seen that the exclusory modern notion of human rights (E/R) is inti-
mately continuous with the violent social exclusions of property impulses identified by
critical accounts (E/P). Can we align an inclusory construction of human rights (I/R)
with an inclusory construction of property (I/P)? Can we, in other words, underline
the ambivalence and contingency of property itself and do so for emancipatory and/
or inclusory ends? Indeed, it seems that we can. Gray’s analysis implies rich scope
54. The term ‘environment’ is problematic, in so far as it indicates that which surrounds or,
literally, spins around (‘envirer’ in the French) the ‘subject’: see A Phillipopoulos-Mihalopoulos
(ed), Law and Ecology: New Environmental Foundations (Routledge, London 2011).
55. Radhakrishnan argues that the production of the increasingly asymmetric socio-material and
juridical relations of globalization should be understood, not only as uneven, but ‘co-symptomatic’:
‘it is only on the basis of a theoretical ethic [based on the ‘symptomatic immanetization of
unevenness’] … that a young entrepreneurial billionaire can be persuaded to feel, perceive and
understand his or her reality as an inhabitant symptom of global unevenness – as much of a
symptom as the abject and voiceless poverty of a homeless being anywhere in the world. In
other words, within the etiology as well as the pathology of the disease [of capitalism], both
the billionaire with a plutocratic lifestyle and the instant-to-instant contingency of the homeless
person are co-symptomatic’: R Radhakrishnan, Theory in an Uneven World (Blackwell, London
2003) at vii.
56. Gray and Gray (n 2).
57. Above (n 2) ‘Civil Rights’.
58. See K Gray and SF Gray, Elements of Land Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005)
at 130–40 for a discussion of this issue and the relevant case law.
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for a re-imagination of property in such terms. However, it is possible to go beyond
Gray’s analysis to emphasize the idea of an I/P re-imagination of property as being fun-
damental to a renewed relationship between human rights and the environment by
deploying an alternative ontology. We can, in short, and as will be indicated below,
found I/P explicitly upon new ontological foundations – on an inter-relational ontology
of the human and environmental which we can think of as placing eco-humane limits,
as a normative matter, upon the exclusory interpretation and application of property
rights and human rights alike. Such an approach unites human rights, property and
environmental concerns in framework of commonality-in-vulnerability, enabling rights
and property to function as key constructs for reaching ‘beyond’ to ‘worlds other’ in the
search for an ecologically responsible, just and humane future.
4.2 Excludability and exclusion: separating the analytical from the ideological
Before we can fully appreciate the theoretical argument in favour of an I/P construct
and then supplement that account with an alternative ontology, it is important to iso-
late the conceptually necessary element of ‘excludability’ in the property construct
from its inappropriate extension in the forms of social exclusion associated with
the modern notion of human rights and the environmentally destructive ideology
implicated by it. We need, in other words, to draw a distinction between the social
exclusions at stake in the property construct as deployed within the modern human
rights paradigm and ‘excludability’59 as the conceptual foundation necessary to
Human rights and property formulations 
E/R Exclusory human rights formulation 
E/P 
Exclusory property formulation 
I/R Inclusory human rights formulation 
I/P Inclusory property formulation 
Human Rights and Property Formulations
59. Gray discusses the conceptual significance of this concept in the provision of vital clues to
the identification of the ‘propertiness’ of property in relation to land: Gray (n 6) at 268–92.
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make sense of a ‘property’ claim at all.60 Accordingly, I attempt to provide analytical
clarification of the difference between excludability and exclusion in order to facilitate
separating the conceptually necessary incidents of a property claim from a proble-
matic discourse of exclusion and control at odds with countervailing, embodiment-
centred, eco-responsive values.
First, it is important to emphasize the complexity of property. Property, like human
rights, is a not a monolithic concept and for present purposes, we will follow Harris
and broadly define ‘property’ as a social and legal institution for organizing human
relationships concerning land and other things and resources, both in terms of their
allocation and use61 – a definition which reveals property to be a characteristic
human institution. Indeed, Harris argues that while it is possible to imagine societies
that have no property concept at all (not even common property),62 such societies are
unknown in practice.63 It appears to be the case, therefore, that all human societies
have a social institution of property whether they are Western or Indigenous. How-
ever, it is also the case that in some societies the property concept does not encompass
all things – for example, the Aboriginals of Australia provide a clear example of a
society with a generally non-proprietary relationship with land. As Blackburn J sug-
gests in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd,64 Aboriginals have ‘a more cogent feeling of
obligation to the land than of ownership of it’, and that it is easier to say that ‘the clan
belongs to the land than that the land belongs to the clan’.65 It seems, therefore, that
while excludability is a necessary feature of a property relationship, and while all
human societies have a social institution of property, excludability need not character-
ize every aspect of human social organization concerning things (such as land, water,
or other elements of the living world).66
Gray has provided an elegant theoretical account of excludability as the analytical
foundation of property, focusing upon private property.67 His work provides a very
useful basis for linking property meaningfully to human rights, environmental con-
cerns and a re-imagined relationship between property, inclusion and justice. Gray
60. See the extensive discussion of the conceptually necessary elements of a property institu-
tion in JW Harris, Property and Justice (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996), especially his discus-
sion of trespassory rules (which delineate Gray’s ‘excludability’) and the ownership spectrum.
61. Harris (n 60) at 3.
62. Societies such as these would have no sense of ‘excludability’ as an aspect of social orga-
nization. Importantly, Harris emphasizes that societies without a concept of private property
could not have a notion of common property. This is because concept of private property is
logically prior to the notion of common property. Harris argues that without a concept of private
property, common property as ‘property’ makes no conceptual sense (n 60) at 15.
63. See Harris’s chapter on ‘Imaginary Societies’ (n 60) at 15–22, together with his discussion
on the ubiquity of property in the introduction to the book (and the references cited there to
AI Hallowell, ‘The Nature and Function of Property as a Social Institution’ in AI Hallowell,
Culture and Experience (University of Pennsylvania Press, Pennsylvania 1955).
64. (1971) FLR 141.
65. At 270ff. In that case, the lack of a concept of a right to exclude others was a decisive
obstacle to the founding of a conventional common law property claim (272 ff). See the discus-
sion of this case and native title generally in the context of considering ‘equitable property’ in
traditional country in K Gray, ‘Equitable Property’ (1994) 47 Current Legal Problems 157 at
181–8.
66. Importantly, we should note that ‘unpropertized’ resources remain outside property, avail-
able for use and enjoyment by all: Gray (n 6) at 268.
67. Ibid, 252.
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argues that a resource can only be ‘propertized’ if it is ‘excludable’ and that a resource
is only ‘excludable’ if it is ‘feasible for a legal person to exercise regulatory control
over the access of strangers to the various benefits inherent in the resource’.68 The
notion of excludability is conceptually indispensable, ‘import[ing] a hidden structure
of rules which critically define the legal phenomenon of private property’.69 However,
a resource may be viewed as being non-excludable for physical, legal or moral rea-
sons. Importantly, a resource cannot be propertized if it lacks the quality of exclud-
ability on any of these grounds.70 We shall consider them briefly in turn.
Physical non-excludability ‘arises where it is not possible or reasonably practicable
to exclude strangers from access to the benefits of a particular resource in its existing
form’.71 The essence of this claim is that no-one can claim property in a resource in
respect of which it is impracticable to exercise consistent, long-term physical control
over access. Gray uses the example of Victoria Park Racing,72 a case in which the
plaintiff sought to prevent the defendant broadcasting races and starting prices for
unauthorized off-course betting purposes using information gathered from the vantage
point of a raised wooden platform erected on neighbouring land. The plaintiff’s claim
failed, among other reasons, because of his failure to prevent ‘visual intrusion’ onto his
land. The contested resource (the ‘spectacle’) was deemed, at the time the case arose for
determination at least, to be physically non-excludable.73 Legal non-excludability con-
cerns an analogous failure successfully to use legal means to protect a resource from
strangers by deploying, for example, intellectual property rules or protective contractual
terms.74 If a claimant has failed to call into play the relevant legal trespassory rules,75 he
or she will have failed to protect his/her claim by delineating and asserting legal exclud-
ability.76 Moral non-excludability, Gray argues, reveals the moral limits to property –
and often concern values close to the heart of human rights discourse:
[C]laims of ‘property’may sometimes be overridden by the need to attain or further more highly
rated social goals … It is no accident that the goals to which ‘property’ defers often relate to
fundamental human freedoms. It is in the definition of moral non-excludables that the law of
property most closely approaches the law of human rights…Moral non-excludables are essen-
tially concerned with the furtherance of constructive interaction, purposive dialogue and decent
(or ‘moral’) communal living.77
68. Ibid, 268.
69. Ibid, 269.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479.
73. Gray (n 6) at 270. Note also Gray’s insistence that the test of physical excludability be
applied with care, because it only applies to the property in its existing form. ‘Ultimately’,
he suggests, ‘most resources can be physically insulated from access by strangers – if only
through vast expenditures of money or imagination’, at 272.
74. ‘The plaintiff who neglects to utilise relevant legal protection has failed, so to speak, to
raise around the disputed resource the legal fences which were plainly available to him. He
has failed to stake out his claim; he has failed in effect to propertise the resource’: Gray
(n 6) at 274.
75. See Harris (n 60) at 23–41 for the way in which trespassory rules form part of the mini-
mum necessary structure of a property institution.
76. Gray (n 6) 274–80.
77. Gray (n 6) at 281.
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It is in the notion of moral excludability that we can most clearly locate and negotiate
the boundary between E/P and I/R, for it reflects a key interface, arguably, at which
legal private property conceptualism comes into direct tension with countervailing
values of inclusion, distributive justice, participatory norms and the needs of embo-
died human beings and the environment.
To the degree that it rests upon excludability, the liberal private property construct
simply exhibits a conceptually necessary feature of any property claim – an analytical
foundation equally indispensable to concepts of common property.78 However, within
the Western legal paradigm, excludability has often been translated, as we have seen,
into an impulse towards a high degree of exclusory control linked historically and
contemporaneously to a predictable and patterned set of social exclusions operative
in law – including in human rights law. This much is clear from a wide range of critical
accounts, as already mentioned, which underline the complexity and ambivalence of
human rights. In particular, violent exclusions, socio-historically implicated by the
‘modern’ human rights project as delineated by Baxi and other post-colonial critics,
now have important continuities with the exclusions of an ascendant neo-liberal
discourse which continues to favour an exclusory property paradigm within an uneven
market-driven global order,79 with direct and deleterious effects upon human and
animal populations and the health of ecosystems.
How then, might we re-imagine property as a construct fully sensitive to I/R values –
or – even more importantly – as an I/P formulation?
4.3 Re-imagining property
It has already been suggested that both property and human rights should be under-
stood to be productively ambivalent. If there are a set of exclusions in human rights
and property that can be read as meaningfully continuous (E/R-E/P) in historical and
ideological terms, it makes good sense (minimally for emancipatory political pur-
poses) to re-imagine property as I/P and render it theoretically harmonious with the
inclusory human rights impulses emerging in the ‘contemporary’ (I/R) notion of
human rights.
Fortunately, reconceptualizing property as an inclusory notion is not a new idea
though it stands, as Gray has suggested, in need of revitalization.80 His analysis,
moreover, implies that the conceptual resources for reformulating the dominant Wes-
tern notion of property exist in the tradition of the West itself – thus allowing I/R pro-
ponents to apply a notionally ‘culturally internal’ form of critique to E/P. Gray reflects
upon two theoretical examinations of the re-conceptualization of property which place
a ‘central emphasis on the need to ensure access to certain human goods as a vital
precondition of securing freedom, dignity and the flourishing of the human spirit’.81
The works in question are CB Macpherson’s The Political Theory of Possessive Indi-
vidualism,82 and Charles Reich’s seminal article ‘The New Property’.83 Reich’s argu-
ment supports the recognition of a ‘new property’, involving the application of
78. See (n 62) and (n 66).
79. See Radhakrishnan’s argument on this point (n 55).
80. Gray (n 65).
81. Ibid, at 170.
82. CB Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: From Hobbes to
Locke (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1962).
83. C Reich, ‘The New Property’ (1964) 73 Yale Law Journal 733.
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protections traditionally accorded to older property forms to modern entitlements such
as welfare payments, pensions, salaries, licences, and subsidies, and crucially, envir-
onmental rights,84 and does not require, as Harris argues, ‘any expansion in the con-
cept of property’.85 Accordingly, we will focus upon Macpherson’s re-imagination of
property, because Reich’s formulation offers less to the present analysis than
Macpherson’s more far-reaching argument.
Macpherson draws on the history of property to argue for a reform(ul)ation of it.
He argues that in the seventeenth century, certain key shifts in the conception of prop-
erty took place, and that what happened, significantly, was reductive – encompassing
a move from a richer, more relational conception of property towards a more impo-
verished, individualistic and possessive one. In this shift, MacPherson suggests, prop-
erty became primarily a thing rather than a right – a reification of property
accompanied, significantly, by the rise of a capitalist market economy and the related
‘replacement of old limited rights in land and other valuable things by virtually unlim-
ited rights’.86 Secondly, Macpherson argues that the meaning of property was reduced
to private property, a development with the effect of obscuring the previously impor-
tant concept of common property to the point where it ‘drop[ped] virtually out of
sight’.87 So complete, indeed, was this reductive conceptual movement that common
property became (incorrectly) treated as ‘a contradiction in terms’.88 So, as Gray puts
it, there was for Macpherson a problematic
tension between two opposed views of the insitutional function of property. On one view,
property comprises essentially a right to exclude strangers from privately owned resources
while, on an older and more expansive view, property had once consisted of a right not to be
excluded from participation in the goods of life.89
Drawing upon this older, more expansive view we can reasonably argue that this con-
ception of property will have common ground with inclusory notions of social rela-
tionship, potentially sensitive, moreover, to concerns of distributive justice and
environmental responsibility. We urgently need to capture a vivid, contemporary
sense of the tension between opposed views of property – to emphasize the ambiva-
lence of property – and to theorize this tension in the context of neoliberal globaliza-
tion and the ineluctably material pressures of climate change. To the degree that
property is conceived of as being exclusively E/P it will almost inevitably obscure
important I/R considerations by treating them as external to the property right, or
hide them behind E/R juridical constructions of entitlement. If history is any reliable
guide, E/P-E/R interests will tend to prevail over I/R considerations. Macpherson’s
analysis provides a basis for challenging E/P with a discourse of rights of access,
inclusion and participation as a characterization of property itself. In other words,
his account offers us the foundation for an I/P formulation of property relations –
one preserving excludability without endorsing problematic forms of social exclusion.
In the contemporary global context there is also great merit in elevating the ideas of
common and communitarian property to a higher status in our consciousness. Such a
84. Gray (n 65) 169.
85. Harris (n 60) at 151.
86. CB Macpherson, Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions (Toronto University Press,
Toronto 1978) at 7 (emphasis added).
87. Ibid, at 10.
88. Ibid.
89. Gray (n 65) at 167.
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shift could serve a potentially important political and rhetorical role, redirecting
conceptions of property (including private property) towards a more inclusive frame
of social reference and turning the mind towards intrinsically non-individualistic
conceptions of property relations. A re-emphasis on common property could, for
example, provide an important conceptual mechanism for the curtailment of over-
extended exclusory claims by asserting, in effect, the limits of private property in
the face of other important interests but crucially, by deploying an alternative
property concept. This need not necessitate the defeat of private property claims
and relations, but could usefully re-contextualize and nuance them. An emphasis
on the ‘commons’, for example, can be used as a powerful counter-commodification
strategy to human rights arguments in the context of natural resources disputes in
order to resist commodity-based property impulses.90 Such strategies need not
obscure conceptually necessary aspects of excludability in the boundary function of
property. They do, however, openly emphasize the possibility and desirability of
having privatization and dispossession ‘no-go’ zones – even within property relations.
Harris argues that Macpherson’s strategy of re-imagining property and deploying it
as a label for certain aspirational inclusory rights is mistaken.91 Clearly, this is an
important objection for the current argument to face. For Harris, despite the apparent
rhetorical advantage gained by the ‘prestige’ accorded to ‘property rights’, the strat-
egy is ‘wholly implausible’ because, in modern consciousness, the rhetoric of ‘human
rights’ has more prestige than property.92 While it may be true that the rhetoric of
human rights has more prestige in contemporary consciousness than property,
human rights discourse, as we have seen, is profoundly ambivalent in its implications.
One significant strand of it is intimately associated with the historically absolutist E/P
conception of property and inhospitable to I/R claims. Harris is therefore mistaken to
criticize Macpherson on the grounds of a misplaced rhetorical strategy as if human
rights were straightforwardly benign in their rhetorical dominance and prestige. E/P
is so foundational to E/R (and so utterly central to the contemporary materialities
of neoliberal globalization, corporate human rights colonization and myriad forms
of commodification, exploitation and control associated with widespread environmen-
tal degradation and rampant forms of human oppression93) that its role as property
ideology needs to be made explicit and counteracted – not by I/R alone – but by
I/P. Property, in other words, needs to be strategically reformulated – even if predomi-
nantly rhetorically – as property.
Gray and Gray have argued that ‘property’ is a ‘spectrum concept’94 sensitive to
the allocation of socially approved user power represented by someone’s ‘property’
in a resource. This, crucially, and in the final analysis, depends ‘upon collective
90. For example, see K Bakker, ‘The “Commons” Versus “Commodity”: Alter-globalization,
Anti-privatization and the Human Right to Water in the Global South’ (2007) 39 Antipode 430.
See also the work being done on commons and rights-based ecological governance for an even
more radical extrapolation of the logic of common property conceptions being pioneered by
Burns H Weston and David Bollier: <http://www.commonslawproject.org/> (date of last access
20 June 2012).
91. JW Harris, ‘Is Property a Human Right?’ in J McLean (ed), Property and the Constitution
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 1999).
92. Addressing CB Macpherson, ‘Capitalism, and the Changing Concept of Property’ in
E Kamenka and RS Neale (eds), Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond (Australian National
University Press, Canberra 1975) at 119–22 and Macpherson (n 86), cited by Harris (91) at 73.
93. As argued above.
94. Gray and Gray, ‘Private Property’ (n 2) at 13.
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perceptions of the social permissibility or public merit attributable to various kinds of
competing user of the resource in question’ implying that ‘a deep sub-text of ‘propri-
ety’ has always pervaded the social and legal definition of ‘property’.95 This brings us
almost full-circle to considerations in relation to the question of moral excludability –
the point at which property notions most closely approach human rights – but it also
represents a site at which cross-currents of inclusion and exclusion could shift their
balance in relation to each other and to both human rights and property paradigms
in a newly responsibility-framed I/P conception of property sensitive to questions
of embodied need and distributive justice. Let us move on from our predominantly
land-based considerations thus far and consider the implications of such an I/P
re-imagination (and the need for it) through the lens of a very brief but salutary con-
sideration of a rather extreme situation concerning the right to water.
4.4 A brief illustration: the right to water
Water offers a highly symbolic, strategically important and instructive case study of the
tensions noted in this article96 and it is set to become the most symbolic and contested
battleground between E/P-E/R and I/R. Certainly, it appears to present a clear case of a
resource ripe for an I/P re-imagination of the property relations clustered around it as it
is a most salient point at which E/P-E/R formulations encounter I/R-I/P resistive ener-
gies. Contestation over the right to water can be conceptualized as being the ultimate
‘frontier issue’ between rights and property paradigms. It forms perhaps the most deci-
sive existing interface between the logic of economic rationality in a globalized world
economy and a logic based on embodiment-centred, countervailing impulses as a ‘rhet-
orically and symbolically powerful… threshold to defend against ever-encroaching
commodification and the spread of economic rationality’.97 Indeed, many regard
water as being the site of an ‘intuitive “last bastion” against privatization’98 and its
socially exclusive implications. Water is also especially relevant in the context of
neo-liberal globalization and E/P property absolutism, for it is at the international
level that the controversy over private sector involvement in water service delivery
reaches its pitch of fiercest intensity. It provides a justice-sensitive lens through
which to refract the underlying issues, because in the globalized context, the closely
related problem of north-south distributional justice takes political centre-stage – as
does the vexing question of climate injustice. Morgan comments that water serves to
draw attention to existing market inequalities between the global south and north in
a particularly focused way.99 In her view, the disputation over water is ultimately linked
to the wider issue of placing appropriate limits on capitalism itself.100
95. Ibid.
96. Morgan argues that water has a particular salience for public discourse: B Morgan, ‘Emer-
ging Global Water Welfarism: Access to Water, Unruly Consumers and Transnational Govern-
ance’ in F Trentmann and J Brewer, Consumer Cultures, Global Perspectives (Berg Press,
Oxford and New York 2006) at 383. Available at <http://seis.bris.ac.uk/~lwbmm/documents/
Trentmann%20and%20Brewer%20book%20chapter%202006.pdf> date of last access 19
June 2012.
97. B Morgan, ‘Water: Frontier Markets and Cosmopolitan Activism’ (2004) 27 Soundings:
A Journal of Politics and Culture 10 at 15.
98. Ibid, at 10.
99. Ibid, at 11.
100. Ibid, at 18.
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It is salutary to reflect upon the fact that according to Morgan, just three transnational
corporations effectively dominate the entire global water market, providing water
services to 300 million individuals in over 200 countries and reflecting the emergence
of an increasingly integrated global water regime in which public aid supplements private
sector investment by the dominant global actors of our age,multinational corporations.101
Arguably, no case is more instructive or symbolic than the notorious Bechtel v Boli-
via case,102 or the ‘Water War’ as it became known.103 In the late 1990s, the World
Bank threatened to withhold debt relief and other development assistance so that the
government of Bolivia was effectively forced to privatize the public water system of
Cochabamba, the country’s third-largest city.104 There was only one bidder for the con-
tract, International Water, a consortium which included the Bechtel Corporation, a US
based transnational corporation.105 The consortium was granted a 40 year lease to take
over the control of Cochabamba’s water supply through a subsidiary, Aguas del
Tunari.106 Within a matter of weeks, the subsidiary imposed water rate rises of more
than 50 per cent on average which forced families living on the minimum wage to
face the prospect of spending up to 25 per cent of their monthly income on water
alone.107 Moreover, the legal framework negotiated had the effect of making the collec-
tion of rainwater subject to a paid permit system – effectively making the unpermitted
collection of rainwater illegal.108 Morgan argues that this particular outcome can per-
haps best be understood as stemming from the interaction between two competing fra-
meworks, one reflecting the idea that rainwater is quintessentially in the commons in an
unmediated relationship with human beings, and the other, reflecting the idea that water
is transmuted into a service susceptible to regulation by a technical infrastructure.
Understood in this light, Morgan argues, from the point of view of the service provider,
‘requiring a permit for rainwater collection may seem a normal part of an exclusivity
clause in the regulatory framework’.109 This outcome can also be read as a stark exam-
ple of the outworking of the logic of the E/P framework. Critical concerns over the
exclusory effects of an E/P formulation find their ultimate epitome in this starkly
101. Ibid, at 11. The three companies are Thames Water, Suez and Vivendi. While 85 per cent
of the world’s population is not supplied by these providers, their operations are significant and
part of a rapidly consolidating, and contested, paradigm for water services delivery.
102. Eventually settled on a ‘no pay’ basis after the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) held that it had jurisdiction to hear the merits of Aguas Del Tunari
S.A. v Republic of Bolivia: ICSID Case No ARB/02/3 Decision on Respondent’s Objections to
Jurisdiction, 21 October 21 2005.
103. For an in-depth account of the case and its implications, see A de Gramont, ‘After the
Water War: The Battle for Jurisdiction in Aguas Del Tunari S.A. v Republic of Bolivia’
(2006) 3 Transnational Dispute Management available at <http://www.crowell.com/documents/
After-the-Water-War_The-Battle-for-Jurisdiction-in-Aguas-del-Tunari_v_Bolivia.pdf> date of
last access 19 June 2012). For an analysis addressing the complex problems of jurisdictional
arbitrage see J Dine, ‘Jurisdictional Arbitrage by Multinational Companies: A National Law
Solution?’ (2012) 3/1 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 44.
104. S Anderson and S Grusky, ‘Challenging Corporate Investor Rule: How the World Bank’s
Investment Court, Free Trade Agreements, and Bilateral Investment Treaties have Unleashed a
New Era of Corporate Power and What To Do About It’, Food and Water Watch, April 2007.
105. Morgan (n 97) at 14.
106. T Johnson, ‘“Water War”: A Test-Case on Trade Transparency’, Miami Herald, 13 Octo-
ber 2002, cited by Anderson and Grusky (n 104).
107. Johnson (n 106).
108. Morgan (n 97) at 14.
109. Ibid, at 15.
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illustrative case which exposes a logic antithetical to human embodied survival and
flourishing, brutally exclusive in its implications and profoundly at odds with any con-
ception of property as a claim for access to the basic goods of life. It is radically anti-I/P
in that sense. Indeed, the privatization of water has in some cases led to outbreaks of
disease and in widespread deaths,110 an outcome exposing the ultimately nacro-political
ratiocination animating E/P-E/R paradigms.
The ambivalence of both property and human rights take on particularly destruc-
tive and hyper-extended implications in the context of neo-liberal imperatives. To the
extent that they are colonized by neo-liberal closures (and the evidence is widespread
concerning the savage realities of this)111 human rights and property become virtually
synonymous with a commercial thanato-logic112 in which the pursuit of profit fully
obscures the potential juridico-ethical implications of human and environmental vul-
nerability while simultaneously entrenching and exacerbating it.113 One possible way
among many of ‘reading’ the mass street protests that erupted against the water cor-
poration in Bolivia is as a direct clash between the cold, untrammelled economic logic
of E/P and a countervailing response emerging from a visceral, ‘felt’ ontology of
embodied need and the related intuition that water, particularly rainwater, should
either be morally non-excludable from propertization or governed by an I/P notion
of common property. The clarity of this fundamental underlying conflict between
commercial logic and I/R-I/P energy remains undiminished by the fact that the discur-
sive dichotomy between perceptions of water as a ‘commodity’ and water as a basic
need is by no means straightforward in the context of the emergent regulatory frame-
work of global water welfarism, as Morgan’s subtle and sophisticated work reveals. In
the context of regulatory frameworks the underlying conflicts between the logics of
commodification and human rights impulses becomes incredibly complex, for
among other things, they are mediated by shifting assumptions, practices of routiniza-
tion, and a dense network of legislative and regulatory rules and practices that make
analysis truly challenging.114 Despite this, it is nonetheless abundantly clear that the
intuitive bottom-line remains a rather intractable clash reflecting a powerful disjunc-
tion between E/R-E/P and I/R-I/P.
5 CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS – TOWARDS NEW
ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
An I/P reformulation sensitive to embodied need is now vital in the search for ‘worlds
other’, particularly in the context of vulnerability-deepening globalization115 and climate
110. See P Bond and J Dugard, ‘Water, Human Rights and Social Conflict: South African
Experiences’ (2007) 1 Law, Social Justice and Global Development Journal <http://go.
warwick.ac.uk/elj/lgd/2008_1/bond_dugard/> date of last access 19 June 2012. The authors
itemize the lethal effects of the privatization or commercialization of water in South Africa –
see pp. 7–8.
111. Baxi (n 1); Westra (n 16); Shiva (n 1); Nibert (n 35).
112. ‘Thanato-’ is a combining form meaning ‘death’, and the term ‘thanato-logic’ implies the
inexorability of the violence and morbidity of the more extreme imperatives of neo-liberalism.
113. P Kirby, Vulnerability and Violence: The Impact of Globalisation (Ann Arbor Press,
London 2006).
114. For a sophisticated account of these complexities, see B Morgan, ‘The Regulatory Face of
the Human Right to Water’ (2004) 15 Journal of Water Law 179–87.
115. Kirby (n 113).
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change pressures. An I/P concept, however, might fail to do full justice to the nexus
between human rights and the environment unless it is based upon a re-imagined
ontology.
Before delineating the outline contours of this alternate ontology, however, it is
helpful to re-trace some argumentative steps. It is likely that the relationship between
human rights and property paradigms is critically important to the relationship
between human rights and the environment. Human rights, as we have seen, are far
from straightforward in their relationship with property, and it has been argued
here that our understanding of human rights and property, if it is to be adequate to
the complex challenges facing us must take full account of the ambivalence of
human rights, and of property itself. We have noted dense linkages and continuities
between E/P and E/R in the modern notion of human rights. We have traced the con-
flict between the logics of exclusion (implicated in private property discourse, priva-
tization, corporatization and commodification) and inclusory energies and impulses
emerging from embodiment-centred reactions to exclusion. We have noted that
these can be understood, and often are, in E/P-E/R v I/R terms and that it is possible
to think of I/R as forming a limit on the property concept (as an instance of moral
excludability). Another way of conceptualizing this relationship, however, is to
argue, as has been done here, that property rights themselves are nuanced (ambivalent,
even) and that E/P can be directly countered by a notion of property constituted in I/P
terms: property as a radical claim for inclusion and access to the basic goods of life
itself.
This claim is both empowering and emancipatory, but it can, and should, be taken
further. I/P-I/R could and should be enabled to open into an eco-responsible breadth of
vision based upon transformed or re-imagined ontological foundations. Sitting at the
heart of all these conflicts and tensions lies the fundamental question of ‘who “we”
are’.116 Are we the disembodied, abstract selves whose humanity is constituted through
the fantasy of the self-referential, appropriative subject acting upon the world as
‘object’? Or are we visceral, embodied beings whose thinking animality is co-formed
in living intimacies with each other and our nearest neighbours (whether human,
non-human animal or elements of a living order to which we owe our very life)?
New ontological foundations fundamental to a truly transformative re-imagination of
property would need to embrace the richest possible set of implications arising from
our embodied, material vulnerability – the blood, bone and affective foundation of
‘felt’ resistance to injustice. A core implication of our embodied materiality is that
we exist in the middle (but not the centre)117 of a living field which forms the inescap-
able, material location within which our corporeality acts and is acted upon by a web of
relations, forces and inter-relational flows. We and the eco-field share, in short, a funda-
mental, inescapably inter-relational existence marked by a radical ontic vulnerability
carrying profound ethico-juridical implications.118 We humans share with other living
beings and systems a mutual, inter-dependent affectability which could be embraced as
the radix of an eco-humane subjectivity, which when proffered as an ontological
116. A fundamental question exercizing philosopher Lorraine Code’s exploration of ecological
subjectivity.
117. A Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘…the Sound of a Breaking String’: Critical Environ-
mental Law and Ontological Vulnerability’ (2011) 2/1 Journal of Human Rights and the Envir-
onment 5.
118. This is the major premise, arguably, underlying L Westra, K Bosselmann and R Westra,
Reconciling Human Existence with Ecological Integrity (Earthscan, London 2008).
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foundation for I/P could transform it into a radical inclusory conception of property
carrying a deep sub-text of vulnerability-responsive, eco-humane responsibility, obliga-
tion and eco-social propriety. In this sense, the deep sub-text which has always
pervaded property119 takes on newly contemporary sensitivities. I/P becomes, in this
light, an ecologically-tempered conception responsive to considerations of distributive
and environmental justice.
Our relationships with our ‘environments’ are never neutral, for we are unavoid-
ably co-constituted by and with the ‘landscapes’ or ‘spaces’ that we inhabit, not
only in material, but in social and discursive dimensions.120 Serious reflection on
human rights understood on the basis of their ambivalence in relation to power,
and in productive conversation with an eco-humane ontology will always inexorably
lead to reflection on the environment and the relationship between its constitution and
questions of inter- and intra-species justice. The environment itself could (and should)
increasingly be understood as an inescapable element of our very existence as human
selves. We need to grasp, both imaginatively and juridically, the ontological reality of
our inter-corporeal enfoldment with (to borrow Merleau Ponty’s language)121 the
living ‘flesh’ of the world. As Primavesi puts it,
[t]he environment is in immediate relation to me: there is no gap between us. In its totality
(viewed as a microcosm or as a macrocosm) it mediates life and death, health and danger,
joy and despair, imagery and companionship. … Thinking of it in this way the image of the
person-in-the-environment is dissolved by a relational, total-field image. The relationships
between me and any other being are such that they belong to the basic definition of what we
are. They are an essential component of what I am in myself.122
MacPherson’s call for a re-imagination of the Western property paradigm cannot be
realized in a manner adequate to the twenty-first century situation without transform-
ing the ontology supporting both rights and property in their current dominant Anglo-
American formulations. We need, urgently, a new sense of self and world if I/P is to
fulfil its rich promise at the nexus between human rights and the environment. Property
can be re-imagined. So, however, must we.
119. Gray and Gray (n 2) ‘Private Property’ at 13.
120. ‘What space is depends on who is experiencing it and how. Spatial experience is not inno-
cent and neutral, but invested with power relating to age, gender, social position and relation-
ships with others. Because space is differentially understood and experienced it forms a
contradictory and conflict-ridden medium through which individuals act and are acted
upon.’: C Tilley, A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places, Paths and Monuments (Berg, Oxford
1994) at 11.
121. M Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception (C Smith (trans.) (Routledge
Classics, London 2002).
122. A Primavesi, ‘Faith in Creation’ in A Race and R Williamson (eds), True To This Earth:
Global Challenges and Transforming Faith (Oneword Publications, Oxford 1995), 101–2
(emphasis added).
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